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On the 26th of December 2004, India and Sri Lanka suffered one of their worst natural calamities.A massive 9.0 magnitude earthquake hit Indonesia off the west coast of Northern Sumatra at
6:29 a.m. (IST) followed by a second earthquake 81 km west of Pulo Kunji, Great Nicobar three hours
later. The earthquakes triggered giant tidal waves, which hit 2,260 km of Indian coastline along the
southeast coast and more than 1000 km along the north, east and southern coasts of Sri Lanka, causing
colossal damage. The current estimates suggest that more than 31,000 people were killed in Sri Lanka
and approximately 11,000 people were killed in India. More than two million people were affected by
this disaster in the two countries, with the number displaced hovering at about 1 million.
The reactions to the Tsunami were vastly different in each country. The Indian government declined
international assistance for relief operations, declaring that sufficient resources were available in the
country to assist those made vulnerable. A significant amount of the coordination and actual relief
effort was done by the government. In Sri Lanka, the government was initially slow to respond and
international, regional and local NGOs were given relatively free access to Tsunami affected areas
(except in the politically sensitive northern and eastern provinces). In both countries, the government
(central, state and district levels), local NGOs, international NGOs already operating within the coun-
try, the private sector and religious groups all set relief processes in motion.
In an effort to understand the dynamics of the relief operation and gather data to inform future relief
efforts, Fritz Institute conducted a study of NGOs1 and affected families in all the districts affected by
the Tsunami in India and Sri Lanka.  This report outlines the top line findings of the study. The NGO
portion of the study included interviews with the relief coordinators of 226 NGOs in India and 150
NGOs in Sri Lanka. The affected families' component included 802 interviews from 100 villages in
India and 604 interviews from 97 villages in Sri Lanka. Both quantitative and qualitative methodologies
were used. All the interviews were conducted in March-April 2005 by trained, native, bilingual investi-
gators using English and/or the local languages, as appropriate.
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E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A RY
1 Includes local NGOs, international NGOs, the Red Cross, and the UN organizations involved in the
relief effort.
F I N D I N G S
Despite vastly different political and economic scenarios, many commonalities existed in bothcountries, suggesting that rescue and relief activities are relatively similar across contexts.
1. The Majority of Rescue and Relief Actors are Local
Eighty-six percent of the affected families surveyed in India said that they received help from the gov-
ernment in the first 48 hours, 59% from medical groups and hospitals, 54% from religious groups and
40% said that their help came from NGOs and the private sector. In Sri Lanka, 39% reported receiv-
ing rescue services from the army, navy and coast guard, but 61% said that they received no assistance
at all in the first 48 hours.  Twenty-three percent had received assistance from some medical organiza-
tions, 20% from religious leaders, 14% from international NGOs, 12% from local NGOs, and only 4%
from the government (see Tables 1 and 2). “Where was the government when all this happened?”
lamented one survivor.
2. The Voice of the Affected is an Important Indication of Relief Effectiveness
During the Tsunami and in the wake of US Hurricane Katrina, one question raised is how effective
relief can be measured. Without benchmarks of what constitutes an “effective” relief operation, those
affected become an important source to gauge the success of the relief providers. In India and Sri
Lanka, the affected people had clear opinions about the aid providers and their satisfaction with the
content and process of aid distribution.  Overall, more than 60% of the people in India and Sri Lanka
reported that the aid that they received in the first 60 days was timely and that they were treated with
dignity. However, these numbers varied widely by district and village and it was clear that in some
areas people had been significantly underserved. It is also interesting to note that there was consider-
able variation in the perceptions of timeliness and respect for dignity. In general, it was perceived that
the medical professionals were most respectful of the affected populations, as they were perceived to
be fair and had an established process for prioritizing needs and providing services. People in India
also expressed humiliation at having to receive charity, especially in the form of used clothes, which
did not always meet local cultural norms (see Table 3).
3. Lack of Logistical Capacity Created Critical Bottlenecks and the Perception of 'Dumping'
In both India and Sri Lanka, aid agencies reported low capacity for warehousing and transportation. In
India, 60% of responding NGOs did not have adequate warehouse facilities and although adequate
relief supplies were received, 40% of organizations lacked transport to carry relief supplies to the
affected population. In Sri Lanka the numbers were very similar, with 58% of those surveyed reporting
inadequate warehouse facilities and 52% inadequate transport capacity (see Table 4). 
Widespread media coverage prompted the donation of inappropriate goods. More than 60% of NGOs
in Sri Lanka and 40% of NGOs in India reported that the receipt of unsolicited supplies had been
high.   The flood of unsolicited supplies, such as used clothing, in conjunction with the lack of ware-
housing and transportation capacity, forced immediate distribution, leaving the affected families with
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the feeling of materials being dumped. “They came in trucks and gave, in excess, all old and used
clothes,” complained one beneficiary. “We didn't take much, they were (piled up) on the road.” 
4. Significant Collaboration Existed Between Agencies
The respondents in both countries observed that NGOs collaborated well with each other.  In India,
70% of the participating agencies indicated that they had collaborated in some way with another
agency, and in Sri Lanka this number was much higher at 85%. Most collaborations involved national
or international organizations working with local community-based organizations. In India, 45% of the
NGOs said that they worked with local NGOs and 11% with international NGOs. In Sri Lanka, 41%
said that they worked with local NGOs and 27% with international NGOs.  Overall, approximately
33% of NGOs in both countries reported that they received some funding from the international
community (see Table 8). In India, 36% of NGOs said that they collaborated with the government,
and in Sri Lanka this number was 28% (see Table 5). 
5. Limited Role of Business
Although the private sector had a high profile in the relief effort in both countries with volunteers
facilitating aid distribution, only 8% of  NGOs in India and 12% of NGOs in Sri Lanka reported
working with the private sector. Those who had worked with the private sector reported that their
experiences had been positive. The collaborations with business included funding for relief operations,
volunteers to distribute food and clothing and remove debris, transportation for people affected, and
delivery of relief supplies.
However, when beneficiaries were asked to rank the organizations that had provided them with vari-
ous forms of relief, the government and the private sector seemed to be the two most common
responses in India (see Table 7). This is perhaps explainable by the fact that companies like Coca-Cola
were very visible distributing water in collaboration with the Red Cross, and others like Tata had
mobilized their own relief services to provide food, water and shelter to thousands of people. Also,
many private hospitals and medical service institutions also provided services to those affected in their
communities. In Sri Lanka the private sector was less visible, and local and international NGOs were
attributed with the bulk of the relief effort. 
6. Coordinating Role of Government is Critical
A significant difference between India and Sri Lanka in the Tsunami relief effort was the role of gov-
ernment.  In India, where the government played a critical role in coordinating the rescue and relief
efforts, the affected families reported satisfaction with the visible and tireless district level administra-
tors who provided and coordinated relief.  In fact, the government was ranked as the number one
provider of aid by the affected people on all the major dimensions of relief services. 
Among the NGOs, more than 85% in India stated that the role of the government in coordinating the
relief had been helpful. In Sri Lanka, the absence of the government, especially in the first 48 hours,
was noticed by those affected and by those responding. Overall, only 48% of the NGOs in Sri Lanka
said that the role of the government was helpful and 27% reported that it was not helpful at all.
R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S
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1. Local Capacity and Preparedness is Key to Effective Relief
One of the lessons from the Tsunami is that most relief is local and that local capacity and prepared-
ness are key to effective relief. In preparing for future disasters, it is critical that there be (a) an accurate
assessment of the local capacity to handle disasters, and (b) collaboration among the various stake-
holders in creating a plan to respond to disasters. Local governments, NGOs, the business community
and the local community in areas vulnerable to disasters each have different perspectives and priorities
with regard to disaster mitigation and relief. Systematically evaluating and integrating these is likely to
create a more nuanced and appropriate plan. Further, since each of these stakeholders must have their
own plans, common protocols about communications hubs,  points of command and control and infor-
mation dissemination are likely to provide a much more robust and coordinated relief effort. In a relat-
ed survey of corporations that participated in the relief effort in India, a number of respondents sug-
gested that it would be important to document lessons learned in order to prioritize needs for future
efforts. As one respondent observed “All are thinking of material supply like food, water and clothes,
but what was necessary was sanitation.”
2. Those Affected Must Have a Voice in the Relief Plan
Another key lesson learned is that those most affected by disasters must be consulted about their prior-
ities and preferences about the type of assistance that is most needed. Often community leaders are
most familiar with the needs of their communities, and incorporating these into relief plans can ensure
that the help is targeted and appropriate. During the Tsunami, the rush to help in any way possible
resulted in mountains of used clothing and inadequate medical help. Also, where central points of
communication and disaster protocols had been established in the community, the loss of life was sig-
nificantly less. 
Consulting local communities before a disaster, during the assessment phase, and in the relief phase
will ensure that those made vulnerable have a voice in describing their needs. In those communities
where relief agencies were able to perform consultations with the local communities during the assess-
ment phase, the damage estimates tended to be more comprehensive and accurate. 
3. Governments Must Play a Key Role in Coordination of Relief
Disasters are chaotic by definition and require coordination of the various actors to avoid duplication
of effort and ensure that the most critical assistance is provided to those who most need it. The influx
of various actors in a disaster situation can cause confusion, bottlenecks, shortages and competition. It
is critical that very clear roles are assigned to local, state and federal authorities with clear criteria of
when each is needed to augment the services and resources provided by the other. In India - where the
relief efforts of the government were praised by the affected families, NGOs and the media - it was the
district level administration, those already familiar with the communities, that led the relief efforts. At
the federal level, the devastating damage of the Gujurat earthquake in 2001 had resulted in a series of
reforms that clarified roles and relationships between various actors. In addition, the government
attributed their collaboration with the media as a key success factor.  The media enabled them to pro-
vide updates to the affected communities, and also find out about problems from media reports. “They
highlighted where the work was done, and where more work was needed,” said one official. However,
many acknowledged that even the relief effort in India fell short at many levels and that lessons
learned from the Tsunami must be institutionalized for the next disaster. For example, “having a single
point of control for all the supplies coming into the region and allocating supplies based on need
should be the desired state for the next disaster,” stated one official.
In Sri Lanka only 29% of the NGOs participating in the study felt the government's coordination role
was 'very helpful' relative to 69% of their peers in India. The government was criticized in the media
for being slow to react, failing to have clear guidelines and policies for relief work and not tackling the
coordination role optimally (see Table 6).
4. Relief Content and Process are Important
An important lesson from this study of NGOs and affected families in the Tsunami is that both relief
content (timing and adequacy) and relief process (distribution methods) are important to effective
relief (see Table 3).  We found that even when the relief content fell short, those affected indicated
greater satisfaction if they perceived that their dignity was respected and they were handled with sen-
sitivity. While most appreciated the food and clothing that came into the region, they were discon-
certed by the different processes that were used to allocate the relief supplies. “There was no proper
queue system in the beginning. We had a lot of fights…” said one person. ”They gave supplies to peo-
ple who belonged to their faith,” reported another. Others described their inability to use the supplies
that were given.  “They were giving rice, but no vessels to cook.” The study also uncovered instances
where the most vulnerable in a community - the very old, the widows and the disabled - were margin-
alized as they were excluded from the distribution of relief supplies. Thus providers of aid must pay
attention to cultural norms, equity in aid distribution, and methodologies for the distribution of aid. 
5. Back Room and Capacity Must Be Developed 
In a relief effort there is much more emphasis on the front-line provision of aid. Food, water, shelter
and clothing are procured, and programs for relief are developed. However, equally important to the
front line is the “back room,” which ensures that the supply chains for relief have been appropriately
planned and that there is transportation and storage for the supplies that are being mobilized.
Visibility to the pipeline is important as is the ability to account for the outcomes intended.
During the Tsunami relief phase, most NGOs and government officials indicated adequate human
resources in terms of volunteers to clear debris and facilitate distribution. What was lacking was tech-
nical expertise and back-room capability such as medical services, transportation and warehousing (see
Table 4). In future relief efforts, significant attention must be paid to the procurement of these types of
resources.
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Table 1: Relief Services Received by Affected Families in the First 48 Hours
India: 802 respondents
Sri Lanka: 604 respondents
Table 2: Affected Families' Recall About Relief Service Providers in the First 48 Hours 
India: 802 respondents
Sri Lanka: 604 respondents
A P P E N D I X
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Relief Service India (%) Sri Lanka (%)
Rescue 48 31
ID of Dead 22 13
Cleaning Debris 15 8
Medical Services 66 33
Food 91 78
Drinking Water 85 70
Relocation 49 3
Bedding 40 26
Clothes 66 52
Infant Food 40 24
Counseling Services 20 6
Agency India (%) Sri Lanka (%)
Government 86 4
Medical 59 23
Religious Groups 54 20
Political Party 45 8
NGOs/Private Sector 40 12
Army/Airforce/CoastGuard 20 39
Fire Rescue 16 1
International Organizations 9 14
Table 3: Affected Families Satisfaction with Timeliness of Aid Delivery and Appropriateness (Dignity)
of the Relief Process
India  Sri Lanka
India: 802 respondents
Sri Lanka: 604 respondents
Table 4: NGO Responses About Resources Available for Relief 
4A: India
Base: 226
4B: Sri Lanka
Base: 150 
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Timely (%) Dignity (%) Timely (%) Dignity (%)
Food 80 60 68 66
Bedding/Shelter 62 54 58 50
Medical Care 75 90 72 75
Clothes 90 45 70 67
Counseling 74 67 68 NA
Warehouse
Transport
Medical
Communication
Material
40%
60%
60%
75%
80%
60%
40%
40%
25%
20%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
yes no
Warehouse
Transport
Medical
Communication
Material
Human
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
yes no
42%
48%
40%
62%
75%
82%
58%
52%
60%
38%
25%
18%
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Table 5: Type of Organizations NGOs Collaborated with 
5A: India
Base: 226
5B: Sri Lanka
Base: 150
Table 6: Coordination by Government
6A: NGO Perceptions of Usefulness of Coordinating Body in India
Base: 226
Type of Organization %
Local NGOs 45
Government 36
International NGOs 11
Military/Police 5
Other Organizations (Religious/ Student Groups) 5
Type of Organization %
Local NGOs 41
Government 28
International NGOs 27
Military 1
Other Organizations (Donors, etc.) 25
Very helpful
Somewhat helpful
Average
Not helpful
Not at all
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
69%
16%
9%
2%
4%
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6B: NGO Perceptions of Usefulness of Coordinating Body in Sri Lanka
Base: 150
Table 7: Top Ranked Relief Providers by Aid Recipients
7A: India   
Type of Relief Rank 1 Rank 2
Drinking Water Government Private Company
Cooked Food Government Private Company & Religious Groups
Dry Ration Government Local NGO, Private Company, Religious Group
Clothes Government Private Company
Toiletries Private  Company Local NGO
Medical Supplies & Medical Care Government Private Company
Utensils, Stove, Fuel Government Private Company, Local NGO 
Bedding & Bedsheets Government Private Company
Materials for Makeshift Shelter Government Local NGO 
Milk/ Infant Food Private Government, Local NGO
Overall Government Private Company
Very helpful
Somewhat helpful
Average
Not helpful
Not at all
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
29%
19%
25%
19%
8%
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7B: Sri Lanka 
Table 8: NGO Sources of Funding
8A: India
Base: 226
8B: Sri Lanka
Base: 150 
Type of Relief Rank 1 Rank 2
Drinking Water Local NGOs Government, Int'l NGOs
Cooked Food Government Local NGOs, Int'l NGOs
Dry Ration Individuals Government
Clothes Individuals Local NGOs
Toiletries Local NGOs Int'l NGOs
Medical Supplies & Medical Care Local NGOs Government
Utensils, Stove, Fuel Local NGOs Int'l NGOs
Bedding & Bedsheets Local NGOs Int'l NGOs
Materials for Makeshift Shelter Local NGOs Int'l NGOs
Milk/ Infant Food Local NGOs Individuals
Overall Local NGOs Int'l NGOs
Source %
Central Government 3.36
State Government 11.62
International Bodies 32.85
Religious-Based Organizations 10.33
Non-Resident Individuals 7.66
Corporate/Business House 10.14
Others 24.04
Source %
Central Government 2
State Government 1.51
International Bodies 31.22
Religious-Based Organizations 3.32
Non-Resident Individuals 12.86
Corporate/ Business House 11.66
Others 37.43
